{"id":801,"date":"2015-02-12T08:35:13","date_gmt":"2015-02-12T08:35:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/?page_id=801"},"modified":"2015-09-18T13:39:43","modified_gmt":"2015-09-18T13:39:43","slug":"similitudo-critica-literaria-ingles","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/similitudo-critica-literaria-ingles\/","title":{"rendered":"Similitudo. Critica literaria ingl\u00e9s"},"content":{"rendered":"

CAMPBELL, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. <\/em>London: V. Strahan and T. Cadell, \u00a01776, 2 vols.<\/p>\n

Comparison<\/strong><\/p>\n

[\u2026] [v.1, p. 193] But if from the experimental reasoning we descend to the analogical, we may be said to come upon a common to which reason and fancy have an equal claim. \u00bb A comparison,\u00bb says Quintilian, \u00abhath almost the effect of an example.\u00bb But what are rhetorical comparisons, when brought to illustrate any point inculcated on the hearers (what are they, I say), but arguments from analogy? In proof of this, let us borrow an instance from the fore mentioned rhetorician: \u00bb Would you be convinced of the necessity of education for the mind, consider of what importance culture is to the ground: the field [v.1, p. 194] which, cultivated, produceth a plentiful crop of useful fruits, if neglected, will be overrun with briers, and brambles, and other useless or noxious weeds. \u00abf It would be no better than trifling to point out the argument couched in this passage. Now if comparison, which is the chief, hath so great an influence upon conviction, it is no wonder that all those other oratorical tropes and figures addressed to the imagination, which are more or less nearly related to comparison, should derive hence both light and efficacy-t Even antithesis implies comparison. Simile is a comparison in epitome, Metaphor is an allegory in miniature. Allegory and prosopeia are comparisons conveyed under a particular form.<\/p>\n

Simile<\/strong><\/p>\n

[v.1, p. 192] Where then lies the difference between addressing the judgment, and addressing the fancy? and what hath given rise to the distinction between ratiocination and imagery? The following observations will serve for an answer to this query. It is evident, that though the mind receives a considerable pleasure from the discovery of resemblance, no pleasure is received when the resemblance is of such a nature as is familiar to everybody. Such are those resemblances which result from the specific and generic qualities of ordinary objects. What gives the principal delight to the imagination, is the exhibition of a strong likeness, which escapes the notice of the generality of people. The similitude of man to man, eagle to eagle, sea to sea, or in brief, of one individual to another individual of the same species, affects not the fancy in the least. What poet would ever think of comparing a combat between two of his heroes to a combat between [v.1, p. 193] other two? Yet no-where else will he find so strong a resemblance. Indeed, to the faculty of imagination this resemblance appears rather under the notion of identity; although it be the foundation of the strongest reasoning from experience. Again, the similarity of one species to another of the same genus, as of the lion to the tiger, of the alder to the oak, though this too be a considerable fund of argumentation, hardly strikes the fancy more than the preceding, inasmuch as the generical properties, whereof every species participates, are also obvious.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

BLAIR, Hugh<\/strong>.\u00a0Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettr<\/em>es<\/em>. 1785.\u00a0<\/em>Ed.\u00a0de Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloram. \u00a0Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005.<\/p>\n

Blair, Hugo.\u00a0Lecciones sobre la ret\u00f3rica<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>y las bellas letras.\u00a0<\/em>Trad.\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0Jos\u00e9 Luis Munarriz. \u00a0Madrid: Ibarra, 1817, 3\u00aa ed.<\/span><\/p>\n

Comparison or Simile<\/strong><\/p>\n

Blair.<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>(Ed. \u00a0de Linda\u00a0Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloram)\u00a0<\/strong>2005<\/p>\n

[p. 184] A Comparison is, when the resemblance between two objects is expressed in form, and generally pursued more fully than the nature of a Metaphor admits.<\/p>\n

Blair \u00a0(trad. Munarriz, 106)<\/span>
\nEs comparaci\u00f3n, cuando se expresa formalmente la semejanza entre dos objetos; y se explica en general con mas extensi\u00f3n que la que pide la naturaleza de una met\u00e1fora.<\/span><\/p>\n

[p. 185] \u00a0All comparisons whatever may be reduced under two heads, explaining and embellishing comparisons. For when a writer likens the object of which he treats to any other thing, it always is, or at least always should be, with a view either to make us understand that object more distinctly, or to dress it up and adorn it. All manner of subjects admit of explaining comparisons.\u00a0
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Blair (trad. Munarriz, 107)<\/span>
\nTodas las comparaciones se pueden reducir \u00e1 dos clases: unas que explican, y otras que hermosean. Cuando un escritor asemeja \u00e1 otra cosa el objeto de que trata, es siempre, o \u00e1alo menos debiera ser siempre, con la mira de hacernos entender mas distintamente aquel objeto, o de revestirlo y adornarlo.<\/span><\/p>\n

[p. 185] R<\/span>esemblance, as I before mentioned, is the foundation of this Figure. We must not, however, take Resemblance, in too strict a sense, for actual similitude or likeness of appearance. Two objects may sometimes be very happily compared to one another, though they resemble each other, strictly speaking, in nothing; only, because they agree in the effects which they produce upon the mind; because they raise a train of similar, or, what may be called, concordant ideas; so that the remembrance of the one, when recalled, serves to strengthen the impression made by the other.\u00a0
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Blair (trad. Munarriz, 109)
\nLa semejanza, como antes dije, es el fundamento de esta figura. Pero no debemos creer, que sea necesaria una semejanza rigurosa. Dos objetos pueden \u00e1 veces compararse uno con otro muy felizmente, aunque en nada se parezcan en la realidad, solamente porque se conforman en los efectos que producen en el \u00e1nimo, \u00f3 porque excitan una serie de ideas semejantes, o por decirlo asi, concordantes de suerte que el recuerdo del uno sirva para fortificar la impresi\u00f3n hecha por el otro.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n


\n<\/strong>[p. 186] \u00a0\u2026the fundamental requisite of a Comparison is, that it shall serve to illustrate the object, for the sake of which it is introduced, and to give us a stronger conception of it.\u00a0
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Blair (trad. Munarriz, 110)<\/span>
\n\u2026el requisito fundamental de una comparacion es que sirva para ilustrar el objeto, por el cual se ha introducido, y para darnos de \u00e9l una idea mas fuerte.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[p. 187] \u00a0\u2026as comparison is not the style of strong passion, so neither, when employed for embellishment, is it the language of a mind wholly unmoved. It is a Figure of dignity, and always requires some elevation in the subject, in order to make it proper: for it supposes the imagination to be uncommonly enlivened, though the heart be not agitated by passion. In a word, the proper place of Comparisons lies in the middle region, between the highly pathetic, and the very humble style.\u00a0
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Blair \u00a0(trad. Munarriz, 112)<\/span>
\n\u2026asi como la comparacion no es estilo de pasion fuerte, asi cuando se emplea para hermosear, tampoco es el lenguaje de un \u00e1nimo enteramente tranquilo. Es una figura de dignidad: y para que sea oportuna, requiere siempre alguna elevacion en el asunto, porque supone \u00e1 la imaginacion singularmente animada, aunque el corazon no est\u00e9 agitado de pasion alguna.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0[p. 187] I proceed, next, to the rules that relate to objects, whence Comparisons should be drawn; supposing them introduced in their proper place.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the first place, they must not be drawn from things, which have too near and obvious a resemblance to the object with which we compare them. The great pleasure of the act of comparing lies, in discovering likenesses among things of different species, where we would not, at the first glance, expect a resemblance.<\/p>\n

Blair (trad. Munarriz, 113)<\/span>
\nPaso \u00e1 tratar de las reglas relativas a los objetos, de los cuales se deben tomar las comparaciones; suponiendo que est\u00e9n introducidas en su propio lugar.<\/span><\/p>\n

En primer lugar, las comparaciones no se deben tomar de cosas, que tengan una semejanza demasiado cercana y obvia con el objeto, con el cual las comparamos. El sumo gusto que hay en comparar, consiste en descubrir semejanzas entre cosas de especies diferentes, en que a primera ojeada no pod\u00edamos esperar semejanza alguna.<\/p>\n

[p. 188] But in the second place, as comparisons ought not to be founded on likenesses too obvious, still less ought they to be founded on those which are too faint and remote. For these, in place of assisting, strain the fancy to comprehend them, and throw no light upon the subject.<\/p>\n

Blair (trad. Munarriz, 115)
\nPero, en segundo lugar, as\u00ed como las comparaciones no se deben fundar en semejanzas muy obvias; as\u00ed tampoco se deben fundar en las que son demasiado remotas: porque estas en lugar de ayudar a la fantas\u00eda, la ponen en tortura para comprenderlas; y no derraman luz alguna en el asunto.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

[p. 188-189]\u00a0<\/strong>In the third place, the object from which a Comparison is drawn, should never be an unknown object, or one of which few people can form clear ideas (\u2026) Every country has a scenery peculiar to it self, and the imagery of every good poet will exhibit it. The introduction of unknown objects, or of a foreign scenery, betrays a poet copying, not after nature, but from other writers. I have only to observe further,
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the fourth place, that, in compositions of a serious or elevated kind, Similies should never be taken from low or mean objects. These are degrading: whereas, Similes are commonly intended to embellish, and to dignify: and, therefore, unless in burlesque writings, or where Similies are introduced purposely to vilify and diminish an object, mean ideas should never be presented to us.<\/p>\n

Blair \u00a0(trad. Munarriz, 117-118)
\nEn tercer lugar, el objeto de que se tome una comparaci\u00f3n jamas debe ser desconocido, \u00f3 tal que pocos puedan formar de \u00e9l ideas claras. (\u2026) Cada pa\u00eds tiene sus escenas particulares: y el buen poeta debe presentar estas escenas. La introducci\u00f3n de objetos desconocidos \u00f3 de escenas extra\u00f1as manifiesta, que el poeta no copia de la naturaleza, sino de otros escritores. Solo me resta observar,
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

En cuarto lugar, que en las composiciones serias o elevadas jamas se deben tomar los s\u00edmiles de objetos bajos o mezquinos. Estos objetos degradan la idea; cuando los s\u00edmiles se dirigen por lo com\u00fan a hermosearla y engrandencerla: y por tanto, a no ser en escritos burlescos, o donde se introducen de prop\u00f3sito los s\u00edmiles para envilecer un objeto, jamas se nos deben presentar ideas bajas.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CAMPBELL, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. London: V. Strahan and T. Cadell, \u00a01776, 2 vols. Comparison [\u2026] [v.1, p. 193] But if from the experimental reasoning we descend to the analogical, we may be said to come upon a common to which reason and fancy have an equal claim. \u00bb A comparison,\u00bb says Quintilian, \u00abhath […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-801","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/801","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/16"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=801"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/801\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1962,"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/801\/revisions\/1962"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/grupos.unileon.es\/mebar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=801"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}