CAMPBELL, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. London: V. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776. 2 vols.
Campbell. 1776
Metaphor
[v. 2, p. 117] There are particularly three sorts of writing wherein we are liable to be imposed on by words without meaning.
The first is, where there is an exuberance of metaphor. Nothing is more certain than that this trope, when temperately and appositely used, serves to add light to the expression and energy to the sentiment. On the contrary, when vaguely and intemperately used, nothing can serve more effectually to cloud the sense, where there is sense, and, by consequence, to conceal the defect, where there is no sense to show. And this is the case, not only where there is in the same sentence a mixture of discordant metaphors, but also where the metaphoric style is too long continued, and too far pursued.* [Ut modicua autem atque translationis usus illustrat orationem: ita frequens et obscurat et taedio complet; continuus vero in allegoriam et aenigmata exit. QUINT. I. viii. C. 6] The reason is obvious. In common speech the words are the immediate signs of the thought. But it is not so here; for when a person, instead of adopting metaphors that come naturally and opportunely in his way, rummages the whole world in quest of them, and piles them one up on another, when (2: 116) he cannot so properly be said to use metaphor, as to talk in metaphor, or rather when from metaphor he runs into allegory, and thence into enigma, his words are not the immediate signs of his thought; they are, at best, but the signs of the signs of his thought. His writing may then be called what Spenser not unjustly styled his Fairy Queen, a perpetual allegory or dark conceit. Most readers will account it much to bestow a transient glance on the literal sense, which lies nearest; but will never think of that meaning more remote, which the figures themselves are intended to signify. It is no wonder then that this sense, for the discovery of which it is necessary to see through a double veil, should, where it is, more readily escape our observation, and that where it is wanting we should not so quickly miss it. As to writers in this way, they are often misled by a desire of flourishing on the several attributes of a metaphor, which they have pompously ushered into the discourse, without taking the trouble to examine whether there are be any qualities in the subject to which these attributes can with justice and perspicuity be applied.
Synecdoche / Metonymy / Antonomasia
[v. 2, p. 178] What hath now been observed concerning metaphor may with very little variation be affirmed of these three other tropes, synecdoche, metonymy, and antonomasia. These are near akin to the former, as they also imply the substitution of one word for another, when the things signified are related. The only difference among them is, that they respect different relations. In metaphor the sole relation is resemblance; in synecdoche, it is that which subsisteth between the species and the genus, between the part and the whole, and between the matter and the thing made from it; in metonymy, which is the most various of the tropes, the relation is nevertheless always reducible to one or other of these three causes, effects, or adjuncts ; in antonomasia, it is merely that of the individual to the species, or conversely. There is one trope, irony, in which the relation is contrariety.
BLAIR, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 1785. Ed. de Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloram. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005.
Blair, Hugo. Lecciones sobre la retórica y las bellas letras. Trad. José Luis Munarriz. Madrid: Ibarra, 1817, 3ª ed.
Blair. (Ed. de Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. Michael Halloram) 2005.
[p. 166] An Allegory may be regarded as a continued Metaphor; as it is the representation of some one thing by another that resembles it, and that is made to stand for it.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 167)
Se puede mirar la alegoría como una metáfora continuada: pues es la representación de una cosa por otra que se le parece, y que se pone para significarla.
[p. 167] This is the first and principal requisite in the conduct of an Allegory, that the figurative and the literal meaning be not mixed inconsistently together. (…) The only material difference between them, besides the one being short and the other being prolonged, is, that a Metaphor always explains itself by the words that are connected with it in their proper and natural meaning (…) but an Allegory is, or may be, allowed to stand more disconnected with the literal meaning ; the interpretation not so directly pointed out, but left to our own reflection.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 71-72).
El requisito primero y principal en la conducta de una alegoría, es que el sentido figurado y el literal no se mezclen de un modo incompatible. (…) La única diferencia esencial entre ellas, a mas de ser la una breve y la otra prolongada, es que la metáfora se explica siempre a sí misma por las palabras, que están conexas con ella en su sentido propio y natural (…) Pero una alegoría está o puede estar menos enlazada con el sentido literal, y no señalarse tan claramente en ella su inteligencia dejándola a nuestra propia reflexión.
[p. 167-68] Allegories were a favourite method of delivering instructions in ancient times; for what we call Fables or Parables are no other than Allegories; (…) An Ænigma, or Riddle, is also a species of Allegory; one thing represented or imagined by another; but purposely wrapt up under so many circumstances, as to be rendered obscure. Where a riddle is not intended, it is always a fault in allegory to be too dark. The meaning should be easily seen through the Figure employed to shadow it.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 72)
Las alegorías fueron un método favorito de instrucción en los tiempos antiguos: pues no son otra cosa que alegorías las llamadas fábulas (…) Un enigma es también una especie de alegoría, en que se representa o imagina una cosa por otra; y que de propósito se envuelve bajo circunstancias que la oscurecen. Siempre que no se intente formar un enigma, es una falta la demasiada oscuridad de la alegoría. Se debe dejar ver fácilmente la significación por en medio de la figura empleada para hacerle sombra.
Metaphor
[p. 155] The relation which is far the most fruitful of Tropes I have not yet mentioned; that is, the relation of Similitude and Resemblance. On this is founded what is called the Metaphor: when, in place of using the proper name of any object, we employ, in its place, the name of some other which is like it; which is a sort of picture of it, and which thereby awakens the conception of it with more force or grace. This figure is more frequent than all the rest put together; and the language, both of prose and verse, owes to it much of its elegance and grace.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 36)
No he mencionado aun la relación mas abundante de los tropos; á saber, la relación de compracion y semejanza. En ella está fundada la que se llama metáfora; y esta se comete, cuando en lugar de usar el nombre propio de un objeto, empleamos en su lugar el nombre de algun otro, que le es semejante; lo cual es una especie de pintura suya, y por lo tanto despierta su idea con mas fuerza, ó mas gracia, esta figura se usa mas que todas las otras juntas: y el lenguage, tanto en prosa como en poesia, debe á ella mucha parte de su elegancia y de su agrado.
[p. 157] This is a figure founded entirely on the resemblance which one object bears to another. Hence, it is much allied to Simile, or Comparison; and is indeed no other than a comparison, expressed in an abridged form. (…) The comparison is only insinuated, not expressed: the one object is supposed to be so like the other, that, without formally drawing the comparison, the name of the one may be put in the place of the name of the other. “The minister is the pillar of the state.” This, therefore, is a more lively and animated manner of expressing the resemblances which imagination traces among objects.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 37)
Esta es una figura fundada enteramente en la semejanza, que tiene un objeto con otro. De aqui es, que está estrechamente unida con el simil, ó compracion; y no es otra cosa, á la verdad, que una comparacion concebida en una forma compendiosa. (…) La comparacion está solamente insinuada, no expresada: se supone que el un [sic] objeto es tan semejante al otro, que sin hacer formalmente la comparacion se puede poner el nombre del uno en lugar del nombre del otro. “El ministro es la columna del estado.” Esta es la manera mas viva y animada de expresar las semejanzas, que la imaginacion descubre entre los objetos.
[p. 158] Of all the Figures of Speech, none comes so near to painting as Metaphor. Its peculiar effect is to give light and strength to description; to make intellectual ideas, in some sort, visible to the eye, by giving them colour, and substance, and sensible qualities. )
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 39)
De todas las figures de la elocucion ninguna se acerca mas á la pintura que la metáfora. Su efecto particular es dar luz y fuerza á la descripcion; y hacer en algún modo visibles las ideas intelectuales , prestandolas color, cuerpo, y calidades sensibles.
[p. 159] … I proceed to lay down the rules to be observed in the conduct of Metaphors; and which are much the same for Tropes of every kind.
The first which I shall mention, is, that they be suited to the nature of the subject of which we treat; neither too many, nor too gay, nor too elevated for it; that we neither attempt to force the subject, by means of them, into a degree of elevation which is not congruous to it; nor, on the other hand, allow it to sink below its proper dignity. This is a direction which belongs to all Figurative Language, and should be ever kept in view.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 43)
…paso á establecer las reglas que deben observarse en la conducta de las metáforas; reglas, que deben observarse en toda clase de tropos.
La primera es, que sean adaptables á la naturaleza del asunto que tratemos; que no sean ni demasiadas, ni demasiado alegres, ni demasiado elevadas para él; que no emprendamos llevar el asunto por medio de ellas á un grado de elevacion incompatible; y que por el contrario no le dejemos decaer de su propia dignidad. Esta es una regla, que pertenece á todo el lenguaje figurado; y que debe tenerse muy presente.
[p. 160] The second rule, which I give, respects the choice of objects, from whence Metaphors, and other figures, are to be drawn. The field for Figurative Language is very wide. All nature, to speak in the style of Figures, opens its stores to us, and admits us to gather, from all sensible objects, whatever can illustrate intellectual or moral ideas. Not only the gay and splendid objects of sense, but the grave, the terrifying, and even the gloomy and dismal, may, on different occasions, be introduced into Figures with propriety. But we must beware of ever using such allusions as raise in the mind disagreeable, mean, vulgar, or dirty ideas. Even when Metaphors are chosen in order to vilify and degrade any object, an author should study never to be nauseous in his allusions.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 45)
La segunda regla es la relativa á la elección de los objetos, de donde deben tomarse las metáforas y otra figuras. Muy basto es el campo del lenguaje figurado. Toda la naturaleza, para hablar en el mismo estilo, nos abre sus tesoros; y nos deja tomar del conjunto de objetos sensibles aquellos que puedan ilustrar las ideas intelectuales ó morales. No solamente los objetos festivos y espléndidos de los sentidos, sino aun los graves, los aterradores, y aun los sombríos y funestos pueden en ciertas ocasiones introducirse con propiedad en las figuras. Pero debemos guardarnos de emplear alusiones, que exciten en el ánimo ideas desagradables, bajas, vulgares, ó asquerosas: y aun cuando se escojan metáforas para envilecer y degradar de intento un objeto, debe procurar el autor no provocar jamas á nausas con sus alusiones.
[p. 161] In the third place, as Metaphors should be drawn from objects of some dignity, so particular care should be taken that the resemblance, which is the foundation of the Metaphor, be clear and perspicuous, not far-fetched, nor difficult to discover. The transgression of this rule makes, what are called, harsh or forced Metaphors, which are always displeasing, because they puzzle the reader, and, instead of illustrating the thought, render it perplexed and intricate.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 47)
En tercer lugar, asi como deben tomarse las metáforas de objetos de alguna dignidad; asi debe tenerse un cuidado particular en que la semejanza, que es el fundamento de la metáfora, sea clara y evidente, y no traída de lejos, ni difícil de percibir. La transgresion de esta regla hace violentas o forzadas las metáforas: lo cual disgusta siempre, porque embaraza al lector; y en lugar de ilustrar el pensamiento lo embrolla, y hace mas intrincado.
[p. 162] In the fourth place, it must be carefully attended to, in the conduct of Metaphors, never to jumble metaphorical and plain language together; never to construct a period so, that part of it must be understood metaphorically, part literally: which always produces a most disagreeable confusion.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 53)
En cuarto lugar, en la conducta de las metáforas debe atenderse con cuidado a no mezclar jamas el lenguage metafórico con el sencillo; ni construir jamas un período, de modo que parte de él se haya de entender metafóricamente, y parte literalmente: lo cual produce siempre la confusion mas desagradable.
[p. 163] In the fifth place, to make two different Metaphors meet on one object. This is what is called Mixed Metaphor, and is indeed one of the grossest abuses of this Figure.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 58)
Es aun mas defectuoso, en quinto lugar, hacer que dos metáforas diferentes recaigan sobre un solo objeto. Esto es lo que se llama metáfora mixta; y á la verdad es uno de los mas groseros abusos de esta figura.
[p. 165] A good rule has been given for examining the propriety of Metaphors, when we doubt whether or not they be of the mixed kind; namely, that we should try to form a picture upon them, and consider how the parts would agree, and what sort of figure the whole would present, when delineated with a pencil. By this means, we should become sensible, whether inconsistent circumstances were mixed, and a monstrous image thereby produced, as in all those faulty instances I have now been giving; or whether the object was, all along, presented in one natural and consistent point of view.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 62)
Se ha dado una buena regla para examinar la propiedad de las metáforas, cuando se duda si son ó no de una clase mixta; á saber, que tratemos de formar de ellas un cuadro; y consideremos cómo se avienen las partes; y qué figura haría el todo si estuviese delineado con un pincel. Por este medio conoceremos palpablemente, si se mezclan circunstancias incompatibles; y si se forma de ellas una imagen monstruosa, como en los ejemplos referidos; ó si el objeto se ha presentado siempre en un punto de vista natural y compatible.
[p. 165] As Metaphors ought never to be mixed, so, in the sixth place, we should avoid crowding them together on the same object.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 62-63)
Así como jamas se deben mezclar las metáforas, así debe evitarse, en sexto lugar, el amontonarlas sobre un mismo objeto.
[p. 165] The only other rule concerning Metaphor, which I shall add, in the seventh place, is, that they be not too far pursued. If the resemblance, on which the figure is founded, be long dwelt upon, and carried into all its minute circumstances, we make an Allegory instead of a Metaphor; we tire the reader, who soon becomes weary of this play of fancy; and we render our discourse obscure.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 64)
La única regla que añadiré, en séptimo lugar, acerca de las metáforas, es que no se lleven muy adelante. Si se insiste mucho en la semejanza en que se funda la figura, y se lleva a esta por todas las circunstancias mas menudas; hacemos una alegoría en lugar de metáfora: cansamos al lector; el cual se fatiga en breve de este juguete de la fantasía: y oscurecemos el discurso.
Metonymy
[p. 154] To Tropes, founded on these several relations, of cause and effect, container and contained, sign and thing signified, is given the name of Metonymy.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 34)
A los tropos fundados en estas relaciones de causa y efecto, de continente y de contenido, de signo y de cosa significada se da el nombre de metonimia.
Synecdoche
[p. 155] When the whole is put for a part, or a part for the whole; a genus for a species, or a species for a genus; the singular for the plural, or the plural for the singular number; in general, when any thing less, or any thing more, is put for the precise object meant; the Figure is then called a Synecdoche.
Blair (trad. Munarriz, 1817, 35)
Cuando el todo se pone por la parte, o la parte por el todo; el género por la especie, o la especie por el género; el número singular por el plural, o al contrario; y en general, cuando una cosa mas o una cosa menos se pone por el preciso objeto medio, entonces la figura se llama sinécdoque.